Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism at McGill University, 2014-15.
The Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism at McGill University in the Department of Political Science and the Research Group on Constitutional Studies is open to established or emerging scholars in political theory and political science, and open with respect to methodology. The Chair will pursue research in constitutionalism broadly construed; an interest in federalism in particular is desirable but not necessary. The ability to engage with scholars and students across methodologies—normative, empirical, intellectual-historical, jurisprudential, and formal, for example— is more important that particular areas of emphasis. The Visiting Fulbright Chair takes an active part in the intellectual life of RGCS and normally delivers one public lecture as well as one research paper to a works-in-progress workshop.
The stipend is $US 25,000 for a one-semester or one-year stay in 2014-15. Open to US citizens who do not reside in Canada. Application deadline is August 1, 2013; application information is here: http://www.fulbright.ca/programs/american-scholars/visiting-chairs-program.html Those interested in applying are welcome to contact Jacob Levy jtlevy@gmail.com and Caitlin McNamara CMcNamara@iie.org .
Showing posts with label federalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label federalism. Show all posts
Monday, June 17, 2013
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Tuition and language politics
Maybe all of the following is obvious and widely-known; I haven't seen it discussed, though.
The "distinct society" portion of the tuition conversation has been mostly about the transfer of authority over higher education from the Catholic Church to the Quebec state in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, and the conscious commitment to work toward a social-democratic model of tuition-free higher education. But it seems to me that there's also a strong relationship with language-population politics.
The Quebec higher education system has several relevant distinct features:
1. CEGEP/ college education going to grade 13
2. Following directly from that, a 3-year university BA
3. A differentiation between tuition for in-province and out-of-province Canadian students-- standard in the US but, I believe, unique in Canada Update: not unique, I'm told in comments, but I'm having trouble coming up with general information. So far it looks to me as if Ontario, BC, Alberta, and Calgary all have uniform Canadian tuition rates, without provincial differentiation. More information, please!)
4. Very, very low in-province tuition-- not 0, but much closer to 0 than to tuition in Ontario or California.
5. Unusually high provincial levels of taxation
I treat (5) as part of higher education policy because defenders of low tuition insist that students aren't trying to avoid paying for their educations; they'll just pay for them later through taxes rather than up-front through tuition; and that this moreover prevents low tuition from being a regressive subsidy to the middle- and upper-class students who are most likely to attend university. And of course it's importantly connected to (4).
Now, the first thought I had in looking at all of this was, "anomalously low tuition and anomalously high taxes to pay for it can go together in a closed society where the same people spend their whole life cycle in the same tax-and-spend system, and the closed society is a convenient assumption for some social democratic modeling, but its empirical falseness means that the micro-level fairness story fails. You'll get people getting their cheap educations and then leaving, while others who have paid full price for a university education elsewhere, or even out-of-province tuition here, migrate here and then pay again through the tax system." Now, one unattractive feature about that from my perspective is that it creates a possible sense that people are doing something wrong, shirking their fair share of the burden for their own education, by out-migrating; I think that's an illiberal norm to run a society on. But on its face it also looks fiscally unsustainable: everyone's incentive is to get the education and then get out. And then I thought to myself, "discouraging out-migration is an important part of the preservation of The french Fact. So I'm missing something."
Separate the population into three groups, and look at how the system works for each.
1) Out-of-province students have roughly neutral incentives to come to university here, but a disincentive to come to university and stay. Out-of-province tuition is roughly comparable to tuition elsewhere in the country (though still lower than Ontario), and out-of-province students get the standard 4-year degree since they didn't go to CEGEP, so if they just come get a BA and leave again they're neither getting any special discount nor paying any special price. But if they come and stay, then they've paid 4 years of normal tuition rather than 3 years of cheap tuition, and then they spend the rest of their lives paying taxes as if they had benefitted from the discount rate. (The same is true-but-moreso for international students.)
2. In-province anglophones have an incentive to do what I described above: get a BA on the cheap by paying three years of low tuition, then migrate out to anywhere else in North America where their taxes will be lower. The incentive to stay local for the BA is very steep.
3. In-province francophones face the same financial incentives as in-province anglophones: a huge incentive to stay local for the BA, since the three-year low tuition degree is vastly cheaper than a four-year normal-tuition degree elsewhere. Then-- here's the part that puzzled me-- they have an incentive at the margin to leave when the high taxes kick in.
But exit in post-collegiate early adulthood is a lot easier for anglophones. They've got, roughly, the whole Canadian and American college-educated labor market open to them, and they enter it on an equal footing with those whose educations were anywhere else in North America.
If English is neither your first language nor the language of your university education, it's a lot harder to suddenly jump into the educated-labor market of anglophone North America at age 22 or 25. You're starting at a disadvantage in that market that doesn't apply if you stay close to home. If, by contrast, you had left home for an English-language four-year education, you'd be a lot more likely to, as it were, defect, and take advantage of the economic opportunities open to anglophone university graduates in other parts of the continent.
So the system as a whole acts as a financial disincentive to permanent in-migration from the rest of North America (and NB that French citizens pay in-province tuition rates, not international tuition rates) and as a marginal incentive to out-migration for anglophones once they've gotten their college educations. But for francophones from Quebec, it acts as a strong incentive to stay at home for university education, a moment when there might otherwise be an especially high risk of permanent out-migration, and a marginal reduction in their ability to out-migrate later.
In other words, even if some number of high-earning francophones leave (and therefore never "pay back" the cheap university educations they receive) the system broadly tends toward making francophone Quebec a more self-contained economic world in which people do spend their whole life cycles, while simultaneously subtly encouraging anglophone out-migration and discouraging anglophone in-migration.
This, perhaps oddly, makes me slightly more sympathetic to the system than I would otherwise be. (It also, of course, makes it more sustainable than it would otherwise be; it significantly retards the get-your-cheap-degree-then-get-out dynamic.) Francophone Quebec does need to be a partly self-contained economic world to be sustainable; a large steady outflow of 18-year olds who never came back could be the beginning of a downward spiral in the viability of the French Fact. (Note, too that a bloated civil service is often a part of this kind of system in postcolonial societies; it provides jobs for a surplus of locally-highly-educated workers.) Of all the possible policies to sustain the French Fact on a population basis, this tax-and-subsidize policy is on the low-coercion side. (It might, probably does, depress the overall prosperity of Quebec, and that has to go into the calculations too; in the long term, la survivance will depend on an economy that is successful, competitive, and attractive, not just one that is self-contained enough to discourage emigration.)
But-- if I'm right about all this-- I do think it's worth acknowledging the uncomfortable truths that the system operates to diminish the mobility of local francophones, indeed depends on doing so, while simultaneously greasing the slide out of town for local anglophones.
This is all back-of-the-envelope modeling, and I'm entirely open to correction and instruction in the comments. See also: Kymlicka and Patten, eds., Language Rights and Political Theory; and an article of mine defending the compatibility of ethnocultural federalism geared with an emphasis on preserving the national minority's culture with liberalism.
The "distinct society" portion of the tuition conversation has been mostly about the transfer of authority over higher education from the Catholic Church to the Quebec state in the wake of the Quiet Revolution, and the conscious commitment to work toward a social-democratic model of tuition-free higher education. But it seems to me that there's also a strong relationship with language-population politics.
The Quebec higher education system has several relevant distinct features:
1. CEGEP/ college education going to grade 13
2. Following directly from that, a 3-year university BA
3. A differentiation between tuition for in-province and out-of-province Canadian students-- standard in the US but, I believe, unique in Canada Update: not unique, I'm told in comments, but I'm having trouble coming up with general information. So far it looks to me as if Ontario, BC, Alberta, and Calgary all have uniform Canadian tuition rates, without provincial differentiation. More information, please!)
4. Very, very low in-province tuition-- not 0, but much closer to 0 than to tuition in Ontario or California.
5. Unusually high provincial levels of taxation
I treat (5) as part of higher education policy because defenders of low tuition insist that students aren't trying to avoid paying for their educations; they'll just pay for them later through taxes rather than up-front through tuition; and that this moreover prevents low tuition from being a regressive subsidy to the middle- and upper-class students who are most likely to attend university. And of course it's importantly connected to (4).
Now, the first thought I had in looking at all of this was, "anomalously low tuition and anomalously high taxes to pay for it can go together in a closed society where the same people spend their whole life cycle in the same tax-and-spend system, and the closed society is a convenient assumption for some social democratic modeling, but its empirical falseness means that the micro-level fairness story fails. You'll get people getting their cheap educations and then leaving, while others who have paid full price for a university education elsewhere, or even out-of-province tuition here, migrate here and then pay again through the tax system." Now, one unattractive feature about that from my perspective is that it creates a possible sense that people are doing something wrong, shirking their fair share of the burden for their own education, by out-migrating; I think that's an illiberal norm to run a society on. But on its face it also looks fiscally unsustainable: everyone's incentive is to get the education and then get out. And then I thought to myself, "discouraging out-migration is an important part of the preservation of The french Fact. So I'm missing something."
Separate the population into three groups, and look at how the system works for each.
1) Out-of-province students have roughly neutral incentives to come to university here, but a disincentive to come to university and stay. Out-of-province tuition is roughly comparable to tuition elsewhere in the country (though still lower than Ontario), and out-of-province students get the standard 4-year degree since they didn't go to CEGEP, so if they just come get a BA and leave again they're neither getting any special discount nor paying any special price. But if they come and stay, then they've paid 4 years of normal tuition rather than 3 years of cheap tuition, and then they spend the rest of their lives paying taxes as if they had benefitted from the discount rate. (The same is true-but-moreso for international students.)
2. In-province anglophones have an incentive to do what I described above: get a BA on the cheap by paying three years of low tuition, then migrate out to anywhere else in North America where their taxes will be lower. The incentive to stay local for the BA is very steep.
3. In-province francophones face the same financial incentives as in-province anglophones: a huge incentive to stay local for the BA, since the three-year low tuition degree is vastly cheaper than a four-year normal-tuition degree elsewhere. Then-- here's the part that puzzled me-- they have an incentive at the margin to leave when the high taxes kick in.
But exit in post-collegiate early adulthood is a lot easier for anglophones. They've got, roughly, the whole Canadian and American college-educated labor market open to them, and they enter it on an equal footing with those whose educations were anywhere else in North America.
If English is neither your first language nor the language of your university education, it's a lot harder to suddenly jump into the educated-labor market of anglophone North America at age 22 or 25. You're starting at a disadvantage in that market that doesn't apply if you stay close to home. If, by contrast, you had left home for an English-language four-year education, you'd be a lot more likely to, as it were, defect, and take advantage of the economic opportunities open to anglophone university graduates in other parts of the continent.
So the system as a whole acts as a financial disincentive to permanent in-migration from the rest of North America (and NB that French citizens pay in-province tuition rates, not international tuition rates) and as a marginal incentive to out-migration for anglophones once they've gotten their college educations. But for francophones from Quebec, it acts as a strong incentive to stay at home for university education, a moment when there might otherwise be an especially high risk of permanent out-migration, and a marginal reduction in their ability to out-migrate later.
In other words, even if some number of high-earning francophones leave (and therefore never "pay back" the cheap university educations they receive) the system broadly tends toward making francophone Quebec a more self-contained economic world in which people do spend their whole life cycles, while simultaneously subtly encouraging anglophone out-migration and discouraging anglophone in-migration.
This, perhaps oddly, makes me slightly more sympathetic to the system than I would otherwise be. (It also, of course, makes it more sustainable than it would otherwise be; it significantly retards the get-your-cheap-degree-then-get-out dynamic.) Francophone Quebec does need to be a partly self-contained economic world to be sustainable; a large steady outflow of 18-year olds who never came back could be the beginning of a downward spiral in the viability of the French Fact. (Note, too that a bloated civil service is often a part of this kind of system in postcolonial societies; it provides jobs for a surplus of locally-highly-educated workers.) Of all the possible policies to sustain the French Fact on a population basis, this tax-and-subsidize policy is on the low-coercion side. (It might, probably does, depress the overall prosperity of Quebec, and that has to go into the calculations too; in the long term, la survivance will depend on an economy that is successful, competitive, and attractive, not just one that is self-contained enough to discourage emigration.)
But-- if I'm right about all this-- I do think it's worth acknowledging the uncomfortable truths that the system operates to diminish the mobility of local francophones, indeed depends on doing so, while simultaneously greasing the slide out of town for local anglophones.
This is all back-of-the-envelope modeling, and I'm entirely open to correction and instruction in the comments. See also: Kymlicka and Patten, eds., Language Rights and Political Theory; and an article of mine defending the compatibility of ethnocultural federalism geared with an emphasis on preserving the national minority's culture with liberalism.
Thursday, March 01, 2012
Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism
Applications now being accepted for 2013-14. $US 25,000 stipend for a semester of research in residence at RGCS at McGill. (US citizens only, post-PhD.) See full description here.
Applications now being accepted for 2013-14. $US 25,000 stipend for a semester of research in residence at RGCS at McGill. (US citizens only, post-PhD.) See full description here.
Tuesday, November 01, 2011
Federalism and freedom
Quebec rejects and refuses to pay for a draconian [and dumb] new federal crime bill.
Quebec rejects and refuses to pay for a draconian [and dumb] new federal crime bill.
Saturday, October 08, 2011
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: Dead or Alive?
The Center for the Study of Federalism at the Meyner Center invites paper proposals for the 2012 APSA Annual Conference
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: Dead or Alive?
Submission deadline: December 15.
The Center for the Study of Federalism at the Meyner Center invites papers on the vitality of the “political and institutional safeguards of federalism” conceived broadly. Consistent with the conference theme of Representation and Renewal, we invite papers that especially examine the extent to which the interests of state and local governments continue to be represented in and protected by the political safeguards of federalism, such as representation in the U.S. Senate, the electoral college, and Senate confirmation of judicial appointments. In its 1985 Garcia decision, the U.S. Supreme Court opined that states should rely on such political safeguards rather than on the Court to protect their powers. We invite a range of papers, from normative and philosophical to historical and empirical, that examine the effectiveness of these safeguards generally and across different branches of government and different policies. Possible questions to consider include: Are the political safeguards of federalism fundamental to the American federal system or has the United States evolved beyond them? How do federalism's political and/or institutional safeguards affect citizen representation? How have the political safeguards fared under united and divided government of the last two decades? Do the political safeguards protect states from unwelcome federal intrusions? Finally, given that 2012 will be the tenth anniversary of the demise of the Supreme Court’s so-called federalism revolution, one can ask what happened to that revolution and are there any signs of a federalism revival from the Roberts’ Court? Papers on other federalism topics will be considered as well, depending on CSF’s panel allocation.
Submit your proposals to: Troy Smith at troy.smith@byuh.edu
The Center for the Study of Federalism at the Meyner Center invites paper proposals for the 2012 APSA Annual Conference
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: Dead or Alive?
Submission deadline: December 15.
The Center for the Study of Federalism at the Meyner Center invites papers on the vitality of the “political and institutional safeguards of federalism” conceived broadly. Consistent with the conference theme of Representation and Renewal, we invite papers that especially examine the extent to which the interests of state and local governments continue to be represented in and protected by the political safeguards of federalism, such as representation in the U.S. Senate, the electoral college, and Senate confirmation of judicial appointments. In its 1985 Garcia decision, the U.S. Supreme Court opined that states should rely on such political safeguards rather than on the Court to protect their powers. We invite a range of papers, from normative and philosophical to historical and empirical, that examine the effectiveness of these safeguards generally and across different branches of government and different policies. Possible questions to consider include: Are the political safeguards of federalism fundamental to the American federal system or has the United States evolved beyond them? How do federalism's political and/or institutional safeguards affect citizen representation? How have the political safeguards fared under united and divided government of the last two decades? Do the political safeguards protect states from unwelcome federal intrusions? Finally, given that 2012 will be the tenth anniversary of the demise of the Supreme Court’s so-called federalism revolution, one can ask what happened to that revolution and are there any signs of a federalism revival from the Roberts’ Court? Papers on other federalism topics will be considered as well, depending on CSF’s panel allocation.
Submit your proposals to: Troy Smith at troy.smith@byuh.edu
Monday, August 29, 2011
ASPLP at APSA: Nomos: Federalism and Subsidiarity
2011 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy
“Federalism and Subsidiarity”
American Political Science Association
Saturday-Sunday, September 3-4, 2011, Seattle
Saturday, September 3
pre-8:00 am: Coffee
8:00 – 9:45 AM Panel I: The City and Federalism
The Conference Center LL1
Principal Paper: “Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism”, Daniel
Weinstock, Philosophy, University of Montreal
Commentator: Loren King, Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University
Commentator: Judith Resnik, Law, Yale University
Chair: Nancy Rosenblum, Political Science, Harvard University
1:45 PM: ASPLP Business Meeting
The Conference Center LL4
2:00-3:45 PM: Panel II: The Constitution and Federalism
The Conference Center LL4
Principal Paper: “Federalism and Subsidiarity, Perspectives from Law”,
Steven Calabresi, Law, Northwestern University
Commentator: Jenna Bednar, Political Science, University of Michigan
Commentator: Andreas Follesdal, Philosophy, University of Oslo
Chair: James E. Fleming, Law, Boston University
7:30-9:00 PM: Annual Reception
Washington State Convention Center 306
Sunday, September 4
pre-8:00 am: coffee
8:00-9:45 AM: Panel III: Against Dual Federalism.
Washington State Convention Center 618
Principal Paper: “Defending Dual Federalism: A self-defeating
enterprise”, Sotirios A. Barber, Political Science, Notre Dame.
Commentator: Ernest Young, Law, Duke University
Commentator: Michael Blake, Philosophy, University of Washington
Chair: Jacob T. Levy, Political Science, McGill University
2011 Annual Meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy
“Federalism and Subsidiarity”
American Political Science Association
Saturday-Sunday, September 3-4, 2011, Seattle
Saturday, September 3
pre-8:00 am: Coffee
8:00 – 9:45 AM Panel I: The City and Federalism
The Conference Center LL1
Principal Paper: “Cities, Subsidiarity, and Federalism”, Daniel
Weinstock, Philosophy, University of Montreal
Commentator: Loren King, Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University
Commentator: Judith Resnik, Law, Yale University
Chair: Nancy Rosenblum, Political Science, Harvard University
1:45 PM: ASPLP Business Meeting
The Conference Center LL4
2:00-3:45 PM: Panel II: The Constitution and Federalism
The Conference Center LL4
Principal Paper: “Federalism and Subsidiarity, Perspectives from Law”,
Steven Calabresi, Law, Northwestern University
Commentator: Jenna Bednar, Political Science, University of Michigan
Commentator: Andreas Follesdal, Philosophy, University of Oslo
Chair: James E. Fleming, Law, Boston University
7:30-9:00 PM: Annual Reception
Washington State Convention Center 306
Sunday, September 4
pre-8:00 am: coffee
8:00-9:45 AM: Panel III: Against Dual Federalism.
Washington State Convention Center 618
Principal Paper: “Defending Dual Federalism: A self-defeating
enterprise”, Sotirios A. Barber, Political Science, Notre Dame.
Commentator: Ernest Young, Law, Duke University
Commentator: Michael Blake, Philosophy, University of Washington
Chair: Jacob T. Levy, Political Science, McGill University
Monday, July 25, 2011
Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism, McGill University, 2012-13
Application deadline: August 1
Stipend: $25,000 for one-semester or yearlong visitorship
Eligibility and how to apply
Call for applications
Application deadline: August 1
Stipend: $25,000 for one-semester or yearlong visitorship
Eligibility and how to apply
Call for applications
Tuesday, February 01, 2011
Conference on federalism and its future
Federalism and Its Future
The University of Texas School of Law
February 10 – February 12, 2011
Thursday, February 10, 2011
4:30—6:00 p.m.
Eidman Courtroom (2.306)
Keynote Address
Vicki Jackson, Georgetown University: "Understanding U.S. Federalism: The Warren Court and Post World War II Models of Constitutional Legitimacy"
Friday, February 11, 2011
9:15—10:30 a.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Michael Greve, Constitutional Disorder: The Promise and Pathology of American Federalism
Discussant: Jacob T. Levy
Moderator: Justin Driver
10:45 a.m.—12:00 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Malcolm Feely and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise
Discussant: Andy Karch
Moderator: Lynn Baker
1:00—2:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism
Ed Purcell, Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry
Discussants: Alison LaCroix, Ed Purcell
2:30—3:45 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: John Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect their Interests in National Policymaking
Discussant: Rob Mikos
Moderator: Abbe Gluck
Moderator: Willy Forbath
4:00—5:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Sujit Choudhry, Federalism, Secession and Devolution: From classical to Post-Conflict
Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term - Forward: Federalism All the Way Down
Discussants: Dan Halberstam, Vicki Jackson (Choudhry), Dan Rodriguez (Gerken)
Moderator: Zack Elkins
Saturday, February 12, 2011
9:15—10:30 a.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation
Discussant: Ann Bowman
Moderator: Frank Cross
10:45 a.m.—12:00 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within
Discussant: Wendy Wagner
Moderator: Jim Rossi
1:00—2:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Robert Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights
Discussant: Louise Weinberg
Moderator: Ernie Young
2:30—3:45 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Dan Rubinfeld and Robert Inman, Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa
Discussant: Rick Hills
Moderator: Dan Rodriguez
3:45 p.m.
Wrap-up
Federalism and Its Future
The University of Texas School of Law
February 10 – February 12, 2011
Thursday, February 10, 2011
4:30—6:00 p.m.
Eidman Courtroom (2.306)
Keynote Address
Vicki Jackson, Georgetown University: "Understanding U.S. Federalism: The Warren Court and Post World War II Models of Constitutional Legitimacy"
Friday, February 11, 2011
9:15—10:30 a.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Michael Greve, Constitutional Disorder: The Promise and Pathology of American Federalism
Discussant: Jacob T. Levy
Moderator: Justin Driver
10:45 a.m.—12:00 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Malcolm Feely and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise
Discussant: Andy Karch
Moderator: Lynn Baker
1:00—2:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism
Ed Purcell, Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise: A Historical Inquiry
Discussants: Alison LaCroix, Ed Purcell
2:30—3:45 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: John Nugent, Safeguarding Federalism: How States Protect their Interests in National Policymaking
Discussant: Rob Mikos
Moderator: Abbe Gluck
Moderator: Willy Forbath
4:00—5:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Sujit Choudhry, Federalism, Secession and Devolution: From classical to Post-Conflict
Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term - Forward: Federalism All the Way Down
Discussants: Dan Halberstam, Vicki Jackson (Choudhry), Dan Rodriguez (Gerken)
Moderator: Zack Elkins
Saturday, February 12, 2011
9:15—10:30 a.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation
Discussant: Ann Bowman
Moderator: Frank Cross
10:45 a.m.—12:00 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within
Discussant: Wendy Wagner
Moderator: Jim Rossi
1:00—2:15 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Author: Robert Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights
Discussant: Louise Weinberg
Moderator: Ernie Young
2:30—3:45 p.m.
Jeffers Courtroom (3.140)
Authors: Dan Rubinfeld and Robert Inman, Federal Institutions and the Democratic Transition: Learning from South Africa
Discussant: Rick Hills
Moderator: Dan Rodriguez
3:45 p.m.
Wrap-up
Monday, January 24, 2011
Note toward a future blog post
Bradford Plumer, like Matt Yglesias, is a fan of the Chinese idea (I'm taking it for granted that they're right about this, I don't know it myself) of having good mayors promoted up through the mayorly ranks.
Sounds good. But I'll go with "no." In the American party system I'm thinking that turns mayorships into almost purely patronage positions. Every medium-sized city mayor in America decides to try to succeed Daley. Who will win? Well, there will be a Democratic primary to decide it. But with dozens of potential candidates who are poorly known to the local voters, someone is going to do some serious vetting: the incumbent's machine, or the governor if of the same party, or US Senators if of the same party... or the President if of the same party.
The U.S. has some 50,000 municipalities. The coordination problem of hundreds or thousands of mayors trying to move around the country and up the totem pole, when the voters "hiring" them in this odd labor market can't possibly have information about most of them, are huge. So, formally or informally, we'd end up with the Chinese model: the party hierarchy would provide the coordination.
American urban government is often nothing to write home about. But I'm unpersuaded that it would be improved by concentrating selection in the national political parties; and I think that's what this would necessarily amount to.
Bradford Plumer, like Matt Yglesias, is a fan of the Chinese idea (I'm taking it for granted that they're right about this, I don't know it myself) of having good mayors promoted up through the mayorly ranks.
If the mayor of a small city—say, out in China's provinces—does a good job, then when his term is up he may get appointed as mayor of an even bigger city. Being able to govern a city is a useful skill, after all, so why not people who have shown some talent at it move up and try their hand at governing bigger cities, rather than restricting the job to whatever local dogcatcher can prove residency? Maybe voters don't want meddling outsiders. But they can make that choice themselves, no?
Sounds good. But I'll go with "no." In the American party system I'm thinking that turns mayorships into almost purely patronage positions. Every medium-sized city mayor in America decides to try to succeed Daley. Who will win? Well, there will be a Democratic primary to decide it. But with dozens of potential candidates who are poorly known to the local voters, someone is going to do some serious vetting: the incumbent's machine, or the governor if of the same party, or US Senators if of the same party... or the President if of the same party.
The U.S. has some 50,000 municipalities. The coordination problem of hundreds or thousands of mayors trying to move around the country and up the totem pole, when the voters "hiring" them in this odd labor market can't possibly have information about most of them, are huge. So, formally or informally, we'd end up with the Chinese model: the party hierarchy would provide the coordination.
American urban government is often nothing to write home about. But I'm unpersuaded that it would be improved by concentrating selection in the national political parties; and I think that's what this would necessarily amount to.
Thursday, July 15, 2010
Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism, 2011-12; application deadline August 2
Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism, 2011-12.
Open to US citizens (who are not also Canadian citizens or permanent residents). The Research Chair awards provide a fixed sum of US$25,000 for stays of 4 to 9 months (one semester or the full academic year). Click here to apply.
Specializations: Normative, jurisprudential, comparative, historical, or analytic/formal studies of constitutional theory and practice, with preference for studies that encompass some aspect of constitutional federalism. Methodologically open within political theory and political science, including intellectual and institutional history.
Additional Grant Activity: Candidates would be invited to take part in a faculty and graduate seminar, with respondents, focused on the chair’s work in progress.
Comments: The McGill University Department of Political Science is an internationally recognized Ph.D. granting department with 29 faculty members with interests spanning Canadian Politics, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. Normative, comparative, Canadian, and jurisprudential research programs on constitutionalism and federalism are all represented within the department. The Research Group on Constitutional Studies, of which the visiting scholar will be a member during his or her visit, encompasses researchers from the Departments of Political Science and Philosophy and the Faculty of Law studying constitutional theory and its antecedents, jurisprudential pluralism and federalism, legal theory, and empirical constitutional politics.
Contact: Olga Naiberguer, Associate Director, International Programs, olga.naiberguer@mcgill.ca or
Jacob Levy, Department of Political Science, jacob.levy@mcgill.ca
www.mcgill.ca/politicalscience
Note: French language ability commensurate with the requirements of the project and the host institution is required. Facility with French not required but an asset.
Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Constitutionalism and Federalism, 2011-12.
Open to US citizens (who are not also Canadian citizens or permanent residents). The Research Chair awards provide a fixed sum of US$25,000 for stays of 4 to 9 months (one semester or the full academic year). Click here to apply.
Specializations: Normative, jurisprudential, comparative, historical, or analytic/formal studies of constitutional theory and practice, with preference for studies that encompass some aspect of constitutional federalism. Methodologically open within political theory and political science, including intellectual and institutional history.
Additional Grant Activity: Candidates would be invited to take part in a faculty and graduate seminar, with respondents, focused on the chair’s work in progress.
Comments: The McGill University Department of Political Science is an internationally recognized Ph.D. granting department with 29 faculty members with interests spanning Canadian Politics, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. Normative, comparative, Canadian, and jurisprudential research programs on constitutionalism and federalism are all represented within the department. The Research Group on Constitutional Studies, of which the visiting scholar will be a member during his or her visit, encompasses researchers from the Departments of Political Science and Philosophy and the Faculty of Law studying constitutional theory and its antecedents, jurisprudential pluralism and federalism, legal theory, and empirical constitutional politics.
Contact: Olga Naiberguer, Associate Director, International Programs, olga.naiberguer@mcgill.ca or
Jacob Levy, Department of Political Science, jacob.levy@mcgill.ca
www.mcgill.ca/politicalscience
Note: French language ability commensurate with the requirements of the project and the host institution is required. Facility with French not required but an asset.
Thursday, May 06, 2010
Problems in ethnofederalism and quasi-federalism
There are a few possible outcomes for today's election in Britain that would be of especially great interest for students of ethnofederalism and quasifederalism.
1) If the Tories gain a plurality but not a majority-- and could get over the top with the help of a Celtic party. It's improbable that they would get such help-- except for the UUP, whose candidates are standing as part of the Tory caucus this year, the gulf between the Tories and the non-English parties is substantial.
But this would also mean that Lib-Lab plus one or two Celtic parties would add up to a majority.
Imagine a hung Parliament in which the Tories have two more seats than Lib-Lab-- but Tories + SNP would be a majority, or Lib-Lab + SNP + Plaid Cyrmu would be a majority.
SNP and PC, like the Bloc Quebecois, are generally committed to not being in the business of deciding who runs the whole state. But at that point (like in the aftermath of the last Canadian election) the pressure on them to pick a side could be ratcheted up. So could the inducements offered to them to do so.
If you're David Cameron under these circumstances, do you open negotiations with the SNP? Or do you rely on the pious hope that they can be left out of the calculations, because Lib-Lab won't do a deal with them either?
Now imagine if Tory seats = Lib-Lab seats precisely. If you're the SNP, can you really resist the chance to play kingmaker, to start a bidding war, to name your price?
2) If the Tories gain a plurality, but Lib-Lab together gains a very slim majority, a different set of problems arise that has nothing to do with the Celtic partiesand everything to do with the West Lothian question. This outcome would mean that the Tories had won a majority of seats in England, given party distributions elsewhere. But the government would be Lib-Lab.
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland-- but not England-- have and regional self-government of varying degrees. England is still ruled directly from Westminster. There has been contention over whether Scottish MPs should be able to vote on individual pieces of legislation that affects England (or England and Wales) but not Scotland. But I think this election result would put the problem in a new, sharper, light. A government that has authority over English-- but not Scottish-- domestic policy would have been decisively chosen by Scottish votes, in the face of an English majority in the other direction.
I could imagine that result being inflammatory; it might finally succeed in igniting widespread English interest in the West Lothian question. That would, I think, pose more dangers for the Tories than it would offer advantages-- as a generation of conflict over Europe showed, identity questions can fracture the Conservative Party, and its leadership has little skill in finessing them. But this outcome would offer a very powerful incentive to the Tories to start playing the Little England card.
See also Chris Lawrence.
Update
We're right in the thick of condition (1)-- and it's amazing how invisible the SNP and PC are. The Bloc Quebecois doesn't enter into governments in Canada-- but it's willing to negotiate its price for tacitly supporting minority governments.
In Britain, the only choices are:
Tory-LibDem coalition, or at least arrangement to keep LibDem from voting down a Queen's Speech;
Tory-Labour grand coalition, which is never going to happen;
a minority government that could be brought down with a sneeze or a stiff breeze, whether Conservative or Labour or Lib-Lab;
or that somebody talks to the SNP and Plaid Cymru and gets their agreement not to vote down a minority government (the SNP, at least, will not take part in government.)
Thisarticle says that the SNP has begun talks with Labour. But that fact isn't being reported anywhere else, and it has the potential to be decisive.
There are a few possible outcomes for today's election in Britain that would be of especially great interest for students of ethnofederalism and quasifederalism.
1) If the Tories gain a plurality but not a majority-- and could get over the top with the help of a Celtic party. It's improbable that they would get such help-- except for the UUP, whose candidates are standing as part of the Tory caucus this year, the gulf between the Tories and the non-English parties is substantial.
But this would also mean that Lib-Lab plus one or two Celtic parties would add up to a majority.
Imagine a hung Parliament in which the Tories have two more seats than Lib-Lab-- but Tories + SNP would be a majority, or Lib-Lab + SNP + Plaid Cyrmu would be a majority.
SNP and PC, like the Bloc Quebecois, are generally committed to not being in the business of deciding who runs the whole state. But at that point (like in the aftermath of the last Canadian election) the pressure on them to pick a side could be ratcheted up. So could the inducements offered to them to do so.
If you're David Cameron under these circumstances, do you open negotiations with the SNP? Or do you rely on the pious hope that they can be left out of the calculations, because Lib-Lab won't do a deal with them either?
Now imagine if Tory seats = Lib-Lab seats precisely. If you're the SNP, can you really resist the chance to play kingmaker, to start a bidding war, to name your price?
2) If the Tories gain a plurality, but Lib-Lab together gains a very slim majority, a different set of problems arise that has nothing to do with the Celtic partiesand everything to do with the West Lothian question. This outcome would mean that the Tories had won a majority of seats in England, given party distributions elsewhere. But the government would be Lib-Lab.
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland-- but not England-- have and regional self-government of varying degrees. England is still ruled directly from Westminster. There has been contention over whether Scottish MPs should be able to vote on individual pieces of legislation that affects England (or England and Wales) but not Scotland. But I think this election result would put the problem in a new, sharper, light. A government that has authority over English-- but not Scottish-- domestic policy would have been decisively chosen by Scottish votes, in the face of an English majority in the other direction.
I could imagine that result being inflammatory; it might finally succeed in igniting widespread English interest in the West Lothian question. That would, I think, pose more dangers for the Tories than it would offer advantages-- as a generation of conflict over Europe showed, identity questions can fracture the Conservative Party, and its leadership has little skill in finessing them. But this outcome would offer a very powerful incentive to the Tories to start playing the Little England card.
See also Chris Lawrence.
Update
We're right in the thick of condition (1)-- and it's amazing how invisible the SNP and PC are. The Bloc Quebecois doesn't enter into governments in Canada-- but it's willing to negotiate its price for tacitly supporting minority governments.
In Britain, the only choices are:
Tory-LibDem coalition, or at least arrangement to keep LibDem from voting down a Queen's Speech;
Tory-Labour grand coalition, which is never going to happen;
a minority government that could be brought down with a sneeze or a stiff breeze, whether Conservative or Labour or Lib-Lab;
or that somebody talks to the SNP and Plaid Cymru and gets their agreement not to vote down a minority government (the SNP, at least, will not take part in government.)
Thisarticle says that the SNP has begun talks with Labour. But that fact isn't being reported anywhere else, and it has the potential to be decisive.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
LaCroix on federalism
I've already ordered my copy of Chicago law professor Alison LaCroix's new book The Ideological Origins of American Federalism and made plans to write about it online at some point. But now I notice that she's been blogging the book's themes chez Balkin:
The New Old Federalism
Commandeering Federalism
Recommended reading, and I hope to start writing some responses later this week.
I've already ordered my copy of Chicago law professor Alison LaCroix's new book The Ideological Origins of American Federalism and made plans to write about it online at some point. But now I notice that she's been blogging the book's themes chez Balkin:
The New Old Federalism
Commandeering Federalism
Recommended reading, and I hope to start writing some responses later this week.
Wednesday, April 07, 2010
The myth of the golden age
One recurring topic around here is the problematic libertarian historical memory of an America in which once, before the Fall, there was Freedom-- whether the Fall was the New Deal or the 1937 switch in time or the 16th Amendment or the Federal Reserve Act or whatever. And I have a special interest in that subset of soi-disant libertarians who I term confederatistas for whom the Fall was apparently 1865. It's a topic of interest for me outside the blog, too: "Federalism and the Old and New Liberalisms" is substantially about the same thing.
Indeed, the second-most trafficked post in this blog's history was about related problems, though I won't link back to it because it names the odd law professor blogger whose wrath it incurred and who seems eager to resume internet fights whenever possible.
Anyways: I wish to recommend a new piece on the problem by David Boaz, VP of Cato: Up from slavery.
One recurring topic around here is the problematic libertarian historical memory of an America in which once, before the Fall, there was Freedom-- whether the Fall was the New Deal or the 1937 switch in time or the 16th Amendment or the Federal Reserve Act or whatever. And I have a special interest in that subset of soi-disant libertarians who I term confederatistas for whom the Fall was apparently 1865. It's a topic of interest for me outside the blog, too: "Federalism and the Old and New Liberalisms" is substantially about the same thing.
Indeed, the second-most trafficked post in this blog's history was about related problems, though I won't link back to it because it names the odd law professor blogger whose wrath it incurred and who seems eager to resume internet fights whenever possible.
Anyways: I wish to recommend a new piece on the problem by David Boaz, VP of Cato: Up from slavery.
Tuesday, February 02, 2010
Study at Quebec universities to offer fast-track to Canadian citizenship
The lead story in the Chronicle this afternoon:
The lead story in the Chronicle this afternoon:
Quebec Offers Fast-Tracked Canadian Citizenship to Foreign Students
By Karen Birchard
Quebec is playing the citizenship card in a bid to recruit to Canada foreign students who might otherwise be tempted to study in Australia, Britain, or the United States.
The province's premier, Jean Charest, who is leading a delegation of university heads on a visit to India, told a packed meeting at the University of Mumbai on Monday that, starting on February 14, foreign students who graduated from universities in Quebec would get "a certificate of selection" that would put them on a fast track to Canadian citizenship.
"Any student who secures a bachelor's, master's, or doctoral degree from any university in Quebec will obtain a certificate of selection to become a citizen of Canada ," said Mr. Charest, according to The Times of India. "We have the right to select our own citizens. We are doing this because we have a shortage of skilled labor."
Mr. Charest said that once foreign students had the certificate, the federal government would then carry out security and health checks before awarding citizenship.
Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Le fédéralisme multinational en perspective : un modèle viable ?
Colloque organisé par Michel Seymour à l’Université du Québec à Montréal
25-26-27 septembre 2009, salle D-R200 de l’UQAM (Pavillon Athanase-David, 1430 Saint-Denis)
Qu’est-ce que le fédéralisme multinational ? Quels sont les enjeux soulevés par la présence de plusieurs peuples au sein d’un État fédéral ? Est-ce que le fédéralisme apparaît tout indiqué pour gérer la diversité nationale ? Ces questions se posent au Canada depuis toujours, mais elles se posent aussi dans plusieurs autres sociétés. Des États fédéraux multinationaux tels que l’URSS, la Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie n’existent plus. La Belgique vacille face au défi d’accommoder la diversité nationale en son sein. Aussi, même si d’autres États multinationaux fédéraux ou quasi-fédéraux tels que l’Inde, l’Espagne et le Canada existent encore, la question de la viabilité de l’État fédéral multinational doit être soulevée.
Des questions plus spécifiques peuvent aussi être posées qui mettent en relation les expériences de sociétés particulières avec la problématique générale du fédéralisme multinational. Quelles sont les promesses du fédéralisme multinational canadien ? Que penser de la reconnaissance du Québec comme nation, de la résolution possible du déséquilibre fiscal, de la limitation du « pouvoir fédéral de dépenser », du rôle international que joue ou que pourrait jouer le Québec et du fédéralisme asymétrique ? S’agit-il d’éléments qui composent le fédéralisme multinational ?
More information is here.
Colloque organisé par Michel Seymour à l’Université du Québec à Montréal
25-26-27 septembre 2009, salle D-R200 de l’UQAM (Pavillon Athanase-David, 1430 Saint-Denis)
Qu’est-ce que le fédéralisme multinational ? Quels sont les enjeux soulevés par la présence de plusieurs peuples au sein d’un État fédéral ? Est-ce que le fédéralisme apparaît tout indiqué pour gérer la diversité nationale ? Ces questions se posent au Canada depuis toujours, mais elles se posent aussi dans plusieurs autres sociétés. Des États fédéraux multinationaux tels que l’URSS, la Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie n’existent plus. La Belgique vacille face au défi d’accommoder la diversité nationale en son sein. Aussi, même si d’autres États multinationaux fédéraux ou quasi-fédéraux tels que l’Inde, l’Espagne et le Canada existent encore, la question de la viabilité de l’État fédéral multinational doit être soulevée.
Des questions plus spécifiques peuvent aussi être posées qui mettent en relation les expériences de sociétés particulières avec la problématique générale du fédéralisme multinational. Quelles sont les promesses du fédéralisme multinational canadien ? Que penser de la reconnaissance du Québec comme nation, de la résolution possible du déséquilibre fiscal, de la limitation du « pouvoir fédéral de dépenser », du rôle international que joue ou que pourrait jouer le Québec et du fédéralisme asymétrique ? S’agit-il d’éléments qui composent le fédéralisme multinational ?
More information is here.
Friday, September 11, 2009
On nationalism and federalism
Via Matt Yglesias, I see that Lawrence Martin is in the Globe and Mail making the following interesting point.
The idea that secessionist politics could be a stabilizing force in a multinational federation figures prominently in Wayne Norman's Negotiating Nationalism (see especially ch. 6) as well as in my own "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," which adds to Norman's arguments an account of how the federal structure of the rest of constitution affects the outcomes of secessionist politics in one culturally distinct province. Three years after his book and two years after my article, I still think we're right, but it's a claim that makes Canadian audiences look at me funny. Interesting to see it start to go mainstream.
Via Matt Yglesias, I see that Lawrence Martin is in the Globe and Mail making the following interesting point.
Since its debut election campaign in 1993, the Bloc has never been beaten by a federalist party. Not in six elections. The demise of the Bloquistes is often predicted. It never happens. They are entrenched. In the next campaign, they are on course to rout the Liberals and Conservatives in Quebec again. [...]
The coddling of the BQ sees Canadian taxpayers subsidize the separatist party to the tune of millions of dollars to run its election campaigns. In that they have to campaign in only one province, the system absurdly favours it over federalist parties. The Bloc is allowed to participate in the English-language debates while running no candidates outside Quebec. Again, nothing is done. We wouldn't want to risk offending their delicate sensibilities.
But, for all its inroads, the Bloc has no reason to celebrate.
There's a great paradox at work here, a rollout of unintended consequences. The Bloc successes have bred failure. The better the BQ does, the further it gets from its goal of sovereignty. The separatists were closest to realizing that ambition in the early-to-mid-nineties, shortly after the Bloc arrived on the scene. Since that time, support for the sovereignty option, despite all the Bloc victories, has consistently been in decline.
The Bloc, it can be mischievously argued, has served the cause of a united Canada. Rarely over the past half-century has Canadian unity been as solid as it is today. It may well be that the Bloc, with its imposing fed-baiting presence in Ottawa, suffices for many Quebeckers as their instrument of sovereignty. It gives vent to pride, to autonomist passions. It wins concessions for the franchise.
If we were to take away the Bloc, if only Canada-minded federalist parties represented Quebeckers in Ottawa, a different scenario is easily imaginable. Conditions could well exist for a more spirited and fractious separatist movement.
Benefiting from the shrewd leadership of Gilles Duceppe and a smart, disciplined caucus, the Bloc has been able to address many of Quebec's grievances. But its steady progress now sees it scraping the barrel in search of meaningful injustices to fortify its underlying pathology (witness its current election advertising planning).
The idea that secessionist politics could be a stabilizing force in a multinational federation figures prominently in Wayne Norman's Negotiating Nationalism (see especially ch. 6) as well as in my own "Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties," which adds to Norman's arguments an account of how the federal structure of the rest of constitution affects the outcomes of secessionist politics in one culturally distinct province. Three years after his book and two years after my article, I still think we're right, but it's a claim that makes Canadian audiences look at me funny. Interesting to see it start to go mainstream.
Friday, August 21, 2009
Deadline extended: CFA: McGill Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Federalism, 2010-2011
See the award announcement here (cumbersome pdf) and information on applying here and here. Applications go through Fulbright/ CIES, not directly to McGill.
The deadline for all Canada-US visiting Fulbright Chairs has apparently been extended to September 30. The McGill Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Federalism is open to junior or senior scholars, doing empirical, normative, or theoretical work, who wish to spend a semester of or the whole of AY 2010-11 at McGill in the Department of Political Science and the Research Group on Constitutional Studies. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents, and must not also be Canadian citizens or permanent residents. Stipend of $CAN 25000, plus up to $CAN 1000 for in-country travel and enrichment.
Feel free to contact me directly for more information-- the Fulbright website is kind of cumbersome.
See the award announcement here (cumbersome pdf) and information on applying here and here. Applications go through Fulbright/ CIES, not directly to McGill.
The deadline for all Canada-US visiting Fulbright Chairs has apparently been extended to September 30. The McGill Visiting Fulbright Chair in the Theory and Practice of Federalism is open to junior or senior scholars, doing empirical, normative, or theoretical work, who wish to spend a semester of or the whole of AY 2010-11 at McGill in the Department of Political Science and the Research Group on Constitutional Studies. Applicants must be US citizens or permanent residents, and must not also be Canadian citizens or permanent residents. Stipend of $CAN 25000, plus up to $CAN 1000 for in-country travel and enrichment.
Feel free to contact me directly for more information-- the Fulbright website is kind of cumbersome.
Thursday, April 30, 2009
The reading list: "Justice Ginsburg's Common Law Federalism"
David L. Franklin, "Justice Ginsburg's Common Law Federalism
Abstract:
This essay examines an often-overlooked facet of the federalism debate in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has pursued a distinctive approach: the role of the state-court common law judge in our federal system. In a series of majority and dissenting opinions, Justice Ginsburg has made clear that she places an exceptionally high value on the capacity of common law judges to render justice and to provide effective remedies to injured parties on a case-by-case basis. Although she acknowledges that Congress has virtually unlimited power to supplant or override this traditional judicial function, she insists upon a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent before countenancing such a result. Justice Ginsburg's vision of the common law judge as a guarantor of individualized justice informs and reflects her view of the law more generally. She draws a relatively sharp divide between the realms of common law and positive law and, more than any other justice on the current Court, conceptualizes common law regimes such as contract and tort as serving primarily remedial rather than regulatory purposes.
David L. Franklin, "Justice Ginsburg's Common Law Federalism
Abstract:
This essay examines an often-overlooked facet of the federalism debate in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has pursued a distinctive approach: the role of the state-court common law judge in our federal system. In a series of majority and dissenting opinions, Justice Ginsburg has made clear that she places an exceptionally high value on the capacity of common law judges to render justice and to provide effective remedies to injured parties on a case-by-case basis. Although she acknowledges that Congress has virtually unlimited power to supplant or override this traditional judicial function, she insists upon a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent before countenancing such a result. Justice Ginsburg's vision of the common law judge as a guarantor of individualized justice informs and reflects her view of the law more generally. She draws a relatively sharp divide between the realms of common law and positive law and, more than any other justice on the current Court, conceptualizes common law regimes such as contract and tort as serving primarily remedial rather than regulatory purposes.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
States of the same nature
Now posted at SSRN:
"States of the Same Nature": Bounded Variation in Subfederal Constitutionalism
And one bit from further in the paper:
Since I finished that draft of the paper, Professor Solum has drawn my attention to this extremely interesting argument which I'll have to incorporate into that section!
Now posted at SSRN:
"States of the Same Nature": Bounded Variation in Subfederal Constitutionalism
"That the federal constitution should be composed of states of the same nature, above all of republican States," Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws.
Abstract:
This paper offers a defense of the bounded variation in state- or provincial-level constitutionalism within a federation. The extreme positions are the traditionally easy normative ones: there's no reason for state-to-state variation in fundamental questions of constitutional value (because once we know what justice demands, it demands it the same everywhere), or the several states' sovereign peoples may enact any old rules they want, because democratic positivism trumps liberal justice. On the second model, states may be constitutionally constrained from the outside, by the federal courts enforcing the federal constitutions, but as a domestic matter their substantive variation could be unbounded. I don't deny that one or the other of these might accurately describe the legal situation in one or another federation. But I will argue that bounded variation is normatively preferable, not just as a middle way but as the right way to attain the benefits of a federal system. And there are at least some good reasons for internalizing the at least some of the boundaries within the constitutionalism and jurisprudence of each state. Constitutions are not social contracts, either of the positivist or the realist sort; and the hybrid constitutionalism of a federal order can't be understood just with reference to founding or with reference to moral truth. It seems to me that this leaves us in the domain of non-dispositive reason-giving and argument about the scope for constitutional variation. It typically does not count as much intellectual progress to say that answers will lie at some indeterminate point in the middle. But the claims of federal supremacy and of state sovereignty have been such that the middle has sometimes seemed squeezed out; there has been a perceived need to resolve the logic of state constitutionalism to a greater degree than the nature of the problem permits.
And one bit from further in the paper:
It is apparent that the position described here allows federal constitutional norms to have some weight in a state's domestic constitutional interpretation. It is perhaps less apparent, but noteworthy, that it allows sister-state constitutional norms and jurisprudence to have such weight. And, perhaps most surprisingly, it allows state-level norms to have weight at the federal level. Perhaps the gravitational weight of federal constitutional interpretation is greater than that of the interpretation of any one of the states, but gravity is mutual, and planets pull on the sun as well as being pulled by it.
Since I finished that draft of the paper, Professor Solum has drawn my attention to this extremely interesting argument which I'll have to incorporate into that section!
Sunday, January 18, 2009
CFP: Theories of federalism
European Consortium of Political Research
European Consortium of Political Research
5th ECPR General Conference, Potsdam
10 - 12 September, 2009
Section Title: International Political Theory
Panel Title: Theories of federalism
PANEL CHAIR
Name: Nenad Stojanovic
Institution: Universität Zürich & Université catholique de Louvain
Email: nenad@ipz.uzh.ch
PANEL CO-CHAIR
Name:
Institution:
Email:
PANEL DISCUSSANT
Name: Helder De Schutter
Institution: University of Oxford
Email: schutter@alumni.princeton.edu
ABSTRACT - Submit a Paper to this Panel
While recent decades have witnessed a remarkable rise in empirical research on federalism, normative approaches to federalism have only very recently started to appear. Interest in these normative issues has coincided with the emergence of a normative interest in forms of self-government for nations. This manifests itself in two related areas: 1. Multinational States. Multinational states are typically confronted with claims to self-government rights by substate national and/or linguistic groups. With respect to these claims, a number of theorists have focused on federalism’s ability to provide self-government to national groups while maintaining a state-wide level of political decision-making. 2. Transnational political constellations. A number of theorists have argued that the form of democracy that is desirable above the level of the domestic state (such as for the EU and other regional multinational associations, as well as at a global level) should not be unitary but federal in nature, because federalism is better able to combine transnational decision-making with significant forms of political autonomy for national groups. Both debates ('domestic' and 'transnational' federalism) overlap extensively and tackle similar issues. The objective of the panel is to contribute to the development of normative theories of federalism in both fields. Here is a tentative guideline of questions for paper givers: - Is federalism in multinational states normatively superior to unitary forms of decision-making, or to secession? - Is federalism in the EU normatively superior to a unitary EU or to a more confederal EU? - How is federalism in transnational political contexts different from federalism in multinational domestic states? - Is federalism democratic? - Is federalism divisive? What are the sources of unity in federal political constellations? - What is the theoretical relationship between federal and consociational arrangements? - Is it unjust that in a multinational federal political constellation resources are distributed on the basis of territorial units instead of individual needs? Could/should we opt for non-territorial forms of federalism? Does federalism disadvantage non-territorial minorities? - What are the relations between the ethnocultural rights of national groups and those of immigrants?
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