Wednesday, August 22, 2007

Recommended reading on the republican guarantee

Via Solum, Huey Long and the Guarantee Clause: Transformation by Assassination, by Gerard Magliocca. Magliocca's book on Jackson was already high on my to-buy-and-read list. This terrific piece of constitutional history tells me that I should add him to my list of authors whose work I go out of my way to keep track of.

This Article contends that the assassination of Huey P. Long (The Kingfish) of Louisiana was a major turning point in the development of New Deal constitutionalism. Following his election as Governor in 1928, Long built one of the most formidable political machines ever seen in the United States. Indeed, he amassed so much power that contemporary observers routinely called his regime the first dictatorship in our history. For instance, Long abolished minority rights in the legislature, curtailed judicial review, took over the vote counting system, established a State Board of Censors to regulate political speech, and declared martial law against his opponents. Moving rapidly on to the national stage with his election to the Senate – he was Senator and Governor at the same time – Long established a national “Share Our Wealth” movement with the goal of challenging Franklin D. Roosevelt for the Democratic nomination in 1936.

The abuses in Louisiana triggered a broad national debate about whether the State still had a republican form of government as required by the Guarantee Clause of Article Four. Eventually, this outbreak of popular constitutionalism reached the President, who was desperate to find a way to stop Long. Not only did the President discuss the issue in press conferences, but he asked the Justice Department to examine the question in a lengthy memorandum. In August 1935, the House of Representatives took the first step to invoke the Guarantee Clause by forming a Select Committee to examine the question. A few weeks later, however, Long was killed and the inquiry was abandoned.

By cutting this confrontation short, Long's assassin unintentionally laid the foundation for modern judicial supremacy. But for this shocking event, the Special Committee would have almost certainly issued a report defining: (1) which rights being infringed in Louisiana were fundamental; and (2) which institutional practices there were so abusive that they struck at the heart of self-government. Such a report, coming in the midst of the collapse in Lochnerian doctrine, would have been an authoritative act of constitutional interpretation on major issues such as incorporation, voting rights, and the status of political minorities. Instead, the task of filling this vacuum fell entirely to the Supreme Court, which began that effort with the most famous footnote in the law - Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products. To a significant extent, Footnote Four's analysis of the conditions under which laws should receive heightened scrutiny was the judicial substitute for a congressional report on Long and the Guarantee Clause.

Accordingly, this Article makes three significant contributions. First, it provides the first detailed treatment (in a law review context) of Huey Long's dictatorship. Second, it documents the last serious effort to use the Guarantee Clause, which disappeared from serious legal discourse after 1935. Third, it provides a window into a fascinating counterfactual world that was only closed off by a highly improbable act.


As I discuss a bit here, the republican guarantee clause was originally thought to be a very important part of the constitutional order-- the central mechanism for central government protection of freedom within states. Indeed I wish I'd had access to this paper when writing mine, since I talk about the republican guarantee in the early era and the Carolene Products jurisprudence arising out of the New Deal era, but had no idea that the two had this kind of bridge between them.

Tuesday, August 21, 2007

Signs of old age

The annual Beloit College "mindset list," which sadistically helpfully reminds professors just how young the incoming frosh are, is out. Most disturbing this year:

2. Humvees, minus the artillery, have always been available to the public.
23. Wal-Mart has always been a larger retailer than Sears and has always employed more workers than GM.
27. Al Gore has always been running for president or thinking about it.
47. High definition television has always been available.
53. Tiananmen Square is a 2008 Olympics venue, not the scene of a massacre.
55. MTV has never featured music videos.
66. The World Wide Web has been an online tool since they were born.


That last doesn't seem quite right. Average frosh enter at 18; 2007-18= 1989. Lynx and Mosaic weren't launched until 1993, and I'd say that the birth of the browser is the real birth of the WWW. But anyway, HTML was invented in late 1990-- the frosh were babies, but not unborn.

Monday, August 20, 2007

Decisions, decisions

What panels to attend? APSA panel times for which I seem unable even to reduce the number of options below three, and often seem stuck at four.


Thursday, August 30, 8 am:


Roundtable: Author Meets Critics: Joshua Foa Dienstag, "Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit"

Roundtable: What Do Empirical Political Scientists Need or Want (If Anything) From Normative Political Theory?

Roundtable: Constituting Republican Government

Political Theory Beyond the State


Thursday, August 30, 4:15 pm:

Roundtable: How Should Normative Political Theorists Use Empirical Findings?

Roundtable: Knud Haakonssen's Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith

Moderation and Fanaticism

Friday, August 31, 10:15 am:

Roundtable: Modernity as a Crossdisciplinary and Interdisciplinary Concept

Roundtable: The Political Theory of Bernard Williams

Is Political Theory 'Beyond Political Science'?

Roundtable: Authors Meet Critics: Walter Murphy's Constitutional Democracy: Creating and Maintaining a Just Political Order and Donald Lutz's Principles of Constitutional Design

Friday, August 31, 2 pm:

Contours of Black Political Thought: Panel I

Images of Federalism in Early Modern and Contemporary Europe

The Problem of Political Obligation

Roundtable: Is Federalism Theory Poor or Theory Rich?


Saturday, September 1, 2 pm:


Virtue and the American Founding

Roundtable: Iris Marion Young: Legacies for Feminist Theory

Roundtable: What's New About the New Originalism?

Global Justice

I don't think I'm getting more indecisive in my old age. I think it's just an unusually good program unusually badly clustered...

Wednesday, August 15, 2007

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

PQ wants full immigration control for Quebec

From the Gazette:

Quebec should have total control over its immigration to send a clear message to newcomers that the province is a francophone state, not a bilingual one, Parti Quebecois Leader Pauline Marois said on Tuesday[...]

Marois believes Quebec needs to attract more immigrants, especially to cope with a declining birthrate and employment needs, but she stressed the province has to send a very clear message to those who decide to settle in Quebec.

"Many of them believe that they are settling in a bilingual state. It's not true. Quebec is a francophone state that respects the rights of its anglophone minority. And when you live in Quebec, you live in French," Marois stated.

She pressed Premier Jean Charest to negotiate with the federal government to gain control over the 40 per cent of immigrants to the province that it does not already handle. Under a 1991 agreement, Quebec can choose the immigrants who have money to invest here and decide how it integrates them. But Ottawa keeps dealing with refugees and immigrants coming to reunite with family members.

Marois argued it's fair to ask for that since Prime Minister Stephen Harper's government recognized Quebec as a nation. Having additional powers would allow Quebec to choose immigrants that will more easily blend into Quebec's culture and values, Marois added.


That last bit is a clever if probably-inevitable reverse-judo attempt. Harper defanged the "nation" question by embracing the word; the PQ can't afford to let that be as free of consequences as Harper would like it to be.

Notice that the PQ is not only playing to traditional themes here. It's also trying to recapture the part of its base that it lost to the anti-immigrant ADQ in the last election-- partly by playing on a subtle distancing between Montreal and the rest of Quebec. Montreal is clearly ground zero of bilingualism in the province, as well as being ground zero of the non-francophone new immigration. The ADQ objects to Montreal as a place and the new immigrants as a group, though language isn't its primary issue. If the PQ can pick up on the rural voters' annoyance at immigrant-heavy Montreal, it may not much matter whether the annoyance is cast as a language issue rather than a religion or race issue. This will be a tricky balance for the traditionally Montreal-francophone-elite centered PQ, but is absolutely necessary for them to figure it out.
I had just been thinking...

about what a shame it is that Phi Beta Cons, National Review's blog ostensibly about higher education, is such an embarrassing waste. The idea of a consistent source of conservative commentary on higher education, written by people who can distinguish between good and bad research, and who are invested in and knowledgeable about higher education, is quite appealing. It seems to me like something that's genuinely missing from the world. But, of course, PBC none of these things. It is instead dedicated to arguing that professors have too much vacation time except that they're all busily whittling away at the foundations of western civilization, that the successful firing of a fraud-committing tenured professor shows the importance of abolishing tenure, that standards of excellence are under mortal threat from the multiculturalist left but shouldn't be compared in importance to, say, fraternities and the need to admit football players, and that affirmative action (for blacks who are not football players) is the very worstest yucky thing in the world, ever.

Then I noticed that it was Inside Higher Ed, and not PBC, that was carrying the following news item-- something that would be of interest to a large number of conservatives who are interested in higher education:

Hillsdale College, which for more than 20 years has declined to accept federal funds, said Monday that it would no longer take financial aid money from the state of Michigan either, The Detroit News reported. Hillsdale officials said in a statement that they would relinquish about $670,000 in state tuition aid that about 350 students at the private institution receive annually and replace the money with private scholarship funds.


Not a huge deal-- but since Hillsdale is both a minor cause celebre among American conservatives for its rejection of federal funds and a longtime patron of conservative thought, the people most likely to find it interesting and important would be PBC's likely readership. Instead, the blog is busy with Candace de Russy's response to the (well-known and correct) argument that the humanities and most social sciences are over- and badly-regulated by Institutional Review Boards that inappropriately apply standards derived from biomedical experiments to all research involving "human subjects."

Her response? The rhetorical "But is there too much oversight or too little?" followed by an non-sequiter about inadequate oversight... of three biomedical studies.

Update: Phoebe Maltz suggests that the problem is structural, that there probably couldn't be such a venue for responsible conservative commentary on the academy. I think she's onto something but that it doesn't have to be as bad as PBC...
Inuit reach deal with Quebec

The Montreal Gazette:


ELIZABETH THOMPSON, The Gazette

Quebec's Inuit have reached a landmark agreement in principle with Ottawa and Quebec City to create an Inuit-controlled government covering the northernmost third of the province.

It will be unlike any other level of government in Canada. Answerable to Quebec's National Assembly, the Nunavik Regional Government will encompass not only the functions normally assumed by a municipality but also those of a school board and a health authority.

"It's quite unique," said Jean-François Arteau, chief negotiator for the Inuit-run Makivik Corporation. "We'll have real elected officials taking real decisions for issues regarding Nunavik residents."

Arteau said the deal should be instrumental in helping the Inuit take charge of their own future and find the solutions best adapted to their communities.

For example, when it comes to a problem such as youth protection or suicide prevention, the new government will be able to adopt a comprehensive strategy that encompasses both education and social services, he said.

The regional government will also have the power to allocate resources where it believes they are most needed, he said.

For example, money can be allocated to address the area's housing shortage instead of being locked in to such specific programs as small business creation. "With the same amount of money, they will be able to do better and manage it more efficiently."

[...]

While contained in only 25 pages, the agreement in principle sets out a detailed blueprint for the Nunavik Regional Government, which will govern the territory north of the 55th parallel, even further north than the giant James Bay hydro-electric site.

The existing Kativik Regional Government, the Kativik School Board and the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services will be amalgamated to create one regional government. It will be run by a Nunavik Assembly, consisting of at least 21 elected members including representatives of each of the territory's 14 communities. An executive council, consisting of five members of the Assembly and headed by the Leader of the Executive Council, will carry out decisions reached by the Assembly.

While the Nunavik Regional Government will have the power to impose property taxes in addition to money it will continue to receive from Quebec and Ottawa, it will not have the authority to collect income or sales taxes. Arteau said the second phase of the agreement, yet to be negotiated, will deal with such issues as royalties for mining in the mineral-rich territory.


Hmm. Good news, but I'm uneasy. There's no mention of any legislative authority, and the reference to municipal powers makes me suspect that legislative authority will be extremely weak and-- more important-- at the ongoing mercy of the Quebec National Assembly. Indigenous self-government can be a powerful force, but there's a constant danger that the indigenous government will become little more than the local branch of social workers and social service administrators controlling the use of funds allocated elsewhere. I'm reminded of the failed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in Australia, and policies there that amounted to self-administration, not self-government.

Development as such doesn't seem to be anybody's priority. (While I don't think that small businesses are best fostered with subsidies, it's a bad sign when that's the only example of something that's not worth spending money on, with no discussion of what the better ways to foster them would be.) And it's worrisome to have resource royalties be punted when that would be one of the chief local sources of revenue.

But I'll provisionally file it under "good news as far as it goes," especially on the basis that a unified level of Inuit government might simply provide a more powerful political voice and focal point for political strength than has existed before. (This is an argument about why even weak and apparently doomed-to-be-unsuccessful indigenous self-government is probably worth having in an essat in Nomos from a couple years ago.)

Update: there's a map in this story.

Monday, August 13, 2007

Poli sci on SSRN

There's now a political science research network for working papers on SSRN, with lots of distinct subfield subject-matter lists. You can browse through them here.

Thursday, August 09, 2007

The truth comes out

A commentator who calls him or herself simply UofCer reveals:
After we took a couple classes with Jacob Levy, a friend of mine made a facebook group: 18 million milligrams of caffeine with Jacob Levy. Every day he would walk in, set two cans of Diet Coke on the table and promptly begin lecturing without notes. If there were more than two cans, you could be certain you'd be late for whatever you had next.


Someone-- I suspect it was one of the architects of this group-- once asked me why it was Diet Coke rather than coffee, given my known proclivities.

The answer: On my way to class, I need my hands free to carry books. And it's dangerous to walk around with a cup of coffee in each of your sports jacket pockets. Two cans of soda will roughly get me through an hour and twenty minutes of talking-- after which time I can go get a proper cup of coffee.

Update: Phoebe Maltz enjoys the black ambrosia, too. In response to people who criticize the money spent, she observes, "If you consider the accused lattes to be a replacement for the three martinis our generation is not having at lunch, and the two packs of cigarettes our generation is not having throughout the day, it looks a bit different."
Pateman elected to British Academy

Carole Pateman has been elected to the British Academy. (She was elected as a regular fellow not an overseas "corresponding" fellow, thanks to her position at Cardiff.)

Wednesday, August 08, 2007

Neutrality 2008 : Call For Papers

Neutrality 2008: Call For Papers. Submission Deadline: 10/20/2007
CALL FOR PAPERS

The Centre for Research in Ethics at the University of Montreal (CRÉUM) is sponsoring an international conference on the ideal of neutrality which will take place in Montreal in May 2008 and will be followed by a workshop. Participants in the conference include: Arash Abizadeh (McGill University) ; Anthony Appiah (Princeton University) ; Richard Arneson (University of California, San Diego) ; George Crowder (Flinders University) ; Peter de Marneffe (Arizona State University) ; Charles Larmore (Brown University) ; Jacob Levy (McGill University) ; Stephen Macedo (Princeton University ); Ruwen Ogien (CNRS-Paris) ; Alan Patten (Princeton University) ; João Cardoso Rosas (Minho University) ; George Sher (Rice University) ; Christine Sypnowich (Queen’s University) ; Steven Wall (Bowling Green State University) ; Daniel Weinstock (CRÉUM, Université de Montréal).

This call for papers is addressed to graduate students and junior researchers interested in presenting their work on neutrality in this workshop.

The idea that the state should be neutral towards conceptions of the good life has been a constant topic of debate for the last thirty years amongst political theorists concerned with the legitimacy of the state. Although some have claimed the debate is passé, many recent works have proved them wrong (Wall and Klosko, 2003 ; Appiah, 2005 ; de Marneffe, 2006 ; Weinstock, 2006 ; Ogien, 2007) as the dialogue between communitarians and liberals has now opened an intense discussion between liberals themselves about the attractiveness or the scope of the neutrality principle, calling at times for a new perfectionism (Sher, 1997 ; Wall, 1998). This colloquium aims to present a diagnosis of the ongoing debate and offer new perspectives. It will be organized around three main topics:

First, the definition of the neutrality principle is open to discussion: even if there’s a broad agreement on its characterization as a constraint on justifications given by the government (justificatory neutrality, (Kymlicka, 1989)), the nature of this constraint and the scope of the principle are highly controversial. Alternative definitions (as equal concern or as neutrality of effects) may not have received appropriate attention (Goodin and Reeve, 1989 ; Wall, 2001 ; Appiah, 2005).

A second important issue questions the relation between neutrality and perfectionism. Some liberals refuse to take neutrality as the only legitimate understanding of liberal principles (Raz, 1986 ; Chan, 2000) and argue for liberal perfectionism. Is this claim valid or attractive? Different versions of perfectionism should be presented and they should answer diverse concerns related to its paternalistic aspect. Neutrality proponents also have to answer serious objections. Although some have argued for a neutralist foundation of neutrality (Larmore, 1993), this path has been criticized in light of the difficulties in building up a case for the neutrality principle without using substantive values such as respect or democratic equality.

A third bundle of questions will focus on practical issues where neutrality is an attractive ideal or, on the contrary, an undesirable principle. Important areas of investigation include education and religion, and, also, language and work. The colloquium hopes to elicit reflection on the possible application of the neutrality ideal to new practical spheres.

Guidelines for submission:
Proposals should address one of these issues and should be between 300 and 500 words in length. Submission deadline is October 20, 2007. Notification of acceptance will be provided by February 1, 2008. Preferred format for all submissions is RTF attachment submitted by electronic mail to Roberto Merrill (nrbmerrill@gmail.com ) and Geneviève Rousselière (groussel@princeton.edu) with “Neutrality 2008 Submission” in the subject line of the email.
The plural states of recognition

La reconnaissance dans tous ses états
The plural states of recognition


Atelier international / International Workshop of the Center for Research in Ethics at the University of Montreal. Registration required : You can now register forthe workshop by sending your name and institutional affiliation to info@creum.umontreal.ca .

Thursday September 27: Struggle for recognition

Recognition : the heritage of a concept
Chair : George Di Giovanni (McGill University)

9 h 15 Robert R.Williams (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Hegel and Aristotle on Recognition and Friendship

9 h45 Simon Thompson (University of the West of England)
Recognition and the rise of democracy

10 h 30 Arto Laitinen and Heikki Ikäheimo (Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies
Esteem as a type of recognition & University of Jyväskylä)

11 h Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie University)
The social mediation of practical self-relation. Normative and critical implications
of current debates on Hegel and recognition


Recognition, conflicts and social movements
Chair: Estelle Ferrarese (Université Strasbourg II)

14 h 30 Christian Lazzeri (Université Paris X – Nanterre)
Le prix de la lutte pour la reconnaissance

15 h Christian Nadeau (Université de Montréal)
Crimes contre l’humanité et théories de la reconnaissance

15 h 45 Hervé Pourtois (Université catholique de Louvain)
Le « tournant délibératif» de la théorie de la reconnaissance : issue ou impasse ?

16 h 15 Emmanuel Renault (ENS LSH Lyon)
Lutte, domination et reconnaissance : qu’est-ce que le modèle hégélien
de la reconnaissance ?


Friday September 28: politics of recognition

recognition of national identities
Chair : Stéphane Courtois (Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières)

9 h Peter Leuprecht (Université du Québec à Montréal)
Droits humains - individuels et /ou collectifs ?

9 h30 Geneviève Nootens (Université du Québec à Chicoutimi)
Reconnaissance, légitimité et démocratie dans les sociétés plurinationales

10 h 15 Michel Seymour (Université de Montréal)
La nation comme sujet de reconnaissance

10h 45 Michel Wieviorka (École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales)
Naissance et déclin du débat sur le multiculturalisme


The institutionalization of recognition
Chair: Daniel Weinstock (CRÉUM)

14 h 15 Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (University of Piemonte Orientale in Vercelli)
Recognition, Respect and Justice

14 h 45 Margaret Moore (Queen’s University)
Toleration, Recognition and Institutional Accommodation

15 h 30 Anne Phillips (London School of Economics)
The risks of recognition

16 h Nancy Fraser (New School for Social Research)
The Priority of Justice:A Critique of Agonistic Approaches to Recognition

Saturday September 29: ethics of recognition

applied ethics of recognition
Chair : Alain G. Gagnon (Université de Québec à Montréal)

9 h Martin Blanchard (Université de Montréal)
Éthique de la délibération et revendications autochtones au Canada

9 h30 Avigail Eisenberg (University of Victoria)
A normatively defensible approach to the recognition of Indigenous identity

10 h 15 Jocelyn Maclure (Université Laval)
La reconnaissance engage-t-elle à l’essentialisme?

10 h 45 Melissa Williams (University of Toronto)
Recognition Regress? The Ontario Sharia Decision
and the Problem of Democratic Will Formation


The moral dimensions of recognition
Chair:Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)

14 h 15 Elizabeth A. Povinelli (University of Columbia)
Recognition, Espionage, Camouflage

14 h 45 Charles Blattberg (Université de Montréal)
Demanding Recognition? On Overly-Adversarial Politics

15 h 30 Rajeev Bhargava (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi)
The Phenomenology of Broken Spirits: Hegel and Taylor on misrecognition
and humiliation

16 h Charles Taylor (McGill University,New School for Social Research and Fribourg)
New Developments in the Politics of Recognition

Monday, August 06, 2007

Now online

Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 (3) APSR, August 2007, pp 459-477. PDF is here, APSA membership or institutional subscription required.

Sunday, August 05, 2007

Political theory awards

From the Foundations of Political Theory organized section of APSA.

AWARD WINNERS

The David Easton Award is given for a book that broadens the horizons of contemporary political science by engaging issues of philosophical significance in political life through any of a variety of approaches in the social sciences and humanities. The award is limited to books published in the previous five years and carries a cash prize of $500.

This year's award goes to Quentin Skinner, of Cambridge University

for Visions of Politics, 3 Volumes, (Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Committee:

Jennifer Pitts, Princeton University; Shannon Stimson, University of California-Berkeley; Stephen White (Chair of Committee), University of Virginia.

First Book Award

The First Book Award is given for a first book by a scholar in the "early stages of his or her career" in the area of political theory or political philosophy. "Early stages" is interpreted to mean that the recipient cannot have held his or her PhD for more than ten years. This award carries a cash prize of $200.00.


This year's award goes to Bryan Garsten, of Yale University, for Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment (Harvard University Press, 2006)



According to the Committee:

In this impressive and timely study, Bryan Garsten explores the early modern critique of rhetoric and persuasively argues on behalf of a classically-based alternative of responsible rhetoric and dialogically-based political judgment. Initially a response to the breakdown of authoritative political and religious sources, early modern liberal thinkers like Hobbes, Rousseau and Kant developed theories of "public reason" that valorized increasingly abstract, elite, and centralized forms of political decision-making. By contrast, thinkers like Aristotle and Cicero commended more public and open forms of political deliberation - now based upon a shared store of rhetorical conventions - yet were both sensitive to, and warned against the dangers of demagogic rhetorical manipulation. One ironic conclusion of Garsten's study is to suggest that ancient thinkers had greater confidence in public reasonableness than was explicitly the case for liberal philosophers. Garsten's sensitive and detailed exegeses are judicious, mature, and resonate deeply with contemporary debates over democratic deliberation and the role of reason and rhetoric in politics.


Best First Book Honorable Mention: Davide Panagia, The Poetics of Political Thinking (Duke 2006):

In The Poetics of Political Thinking , Davide Panagia provides a strikingly original perspective on aesthetics, ethics, and politics. Political theories, he argues, are composed of mutilayered, multivalent ideas and, hence, are best understood as "images" of thinking rather than philosophical arguments. By weaving together painting, poetry, and philosophy, Panagia reveals how unrepresentability haunts our thinking about politics. His new readings of Hobbes, Rawls, and Habermas place their ideas in productive conversation with Deleuze, Ranciere, and Hazlitt, among others. The images of political thinking that emerge mirror the "disjunctive encounters between dissimilars" characteristic of democratic negotiations of difference. Panagia's eloquently written and thought-provoking book challenges political theorists to think differently about how we read and what we do.

Committee:

Patrick Deneen (Chair of Committee), Georgetown University; Roxanne Euben,
Wellesley College; Nancy Love, Pennsylvania State University

Wednesday, August 01, 2007

Books to buy

APSA's now just around the corner, so no new academic book purchases for the next month. Especially now that the Canadian dollar is so high against the American dollar, it's much better to pick books up at 20-40% off American list prices than to get them at (already-higher) Canadian list prices. So time to start keeping a list of books-- mainly 2007 releases, but also some backlist items that I've recently noticed and don't own yet.

Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture, was top of the list but I just got a review copy. Still, looking like a busy buying year. My shopping list so far:

Adrian Vermeuele, Mechanisms of Democracy (Oxford)
Harro Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought (Cambridge)
Gerard Magliocca, Andrew Jackson and the Constitution (Kansas)
Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property (Oxford)
Colin Farrelly, Justice, Democracy and Reasonable Agreement (Palgrave)
John Millar, An Historical View of English Government (Liberty Fund)
Hamilton and Madison, Pacificus–Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794 (Liberty Fund)
Jean Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England (Liberty Fund) (This is a very exciting volume to have back in print)
Brian Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (Cambridge) (Shameful that I don't have this one yet, really, but it was sold out at APSA last year and then I forgot that I hadn't gotten it)
Andrew Mason, Leveling the Playing Field (Oxford)
Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–1642 (Cambridge)
Sarah Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism (Cambridge)
Suzanne Dovi, The Good Representative, Blackwell
Rhodes et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions
Sotirios A. Barber and James E. Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (Oxford)
Philip G. Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton)
Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Rights: The Substance of Self-Government
(Princeton)
Howard Schweber, The Language of Liberal Constitutionalism (Cambridge)
Urbinati and Zakaras, eds., J.S. Mill's Political Thought (Cambridge)
James Otteson, Actual Ethics (Cambridge)
Mark Francis, Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern Life (Cornell)
Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranovich, eds., Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances

Hmm. I'm sure there was another list that I wrote down somewhere, but this'll probably do for a start...

Tuesday, July 31, 2007

Hm.

Not sure how I hadn't known about the blog of Waterloo political theorist Colin Farrelly, In search of enlightenment. Onto the blogroll it goes. A sample from a recent post on some of my favorite methodological themes in political theory, titled "What Justice Demands, 'Many-Things Considered.'" See also his post on Political "Philosophy."

Our attention to the demands of justice can be developed at many different levels of abstraction. Here is a simplistic typology of the different levels of analysis one could be concerned with:

(1) what the demands of justice are, “all-things-considered”
(2) what the demands of justice are, “many-things-considered”
(3) what the demands of justice are, “some-things-considered”
(4) what the demands of justice are ,“when only abstract concepts (e.g. equality) are considered” (or, what justice requires when justice is construed purely as an abstract ideal or Platonic form).

I believe that something like this typology is very useful and can help political philosophers and theorists explain a lot of what is going on between proponents of different theoretical traditions. Egalitarians believe that others (like libertarians) ignore the harmful effects of the free market (e.g. the vulnerability of the worst off, inequality, etc.). Libertarians believe that egalitarians ignore the importance of side constraints or the inefficiency of the planned economy, etc. Feminists believe liberals ignore the realities of patriarchy. Multiculturalists believe that liberals ignore the fact of cultural inequality. And finally deliberative democrats believe justice-theorists ignore the limitations of their own armchair theorizing and the importance of democratic practices and institutions, disagreement, etc. One could go on and on, revealing how some theories are attuned to different kinds of concerns and ignore (or bracket) others.

These various considerations have lead me to be much more a pluralist than I once was. Certain values have an important role to play in certain contexts but not others, and figuring out when they have a role to play is the real important challenge. So for me the real action takes place in (2) (with (1) being a kind of ideal that we strive for but never reach), rather than in (3) or (4).

The most influential example of (3) is John Rawls’s theory of “justice as fairness”. Rawls takes some important considerations (e.g. moderate scarcity, pluralism, impartiality, etc.) seriously but he also invokes a number of idealizing assumptions that impoverish his theory (e.g. full compliance, society is closed and full of normal functioning people). And these idealized assumptions really skew and impair the prescriptions of Rawlsian justice.

Those partial to (4) might argue that I am confusing two different things- principles of justice and principles of regulation. This of course raises important questions concerning what kind of principles the principles of justice are (e.g. do they serve as a guide for human action). And this adds a further layer of debate to these issues. For me, there is no substantive difference between principles of justice and principles of regulation (though not every principle of justice need be a principle to regulate an institution). The principles of justice are those principles that dictate how a just society is to be regulated. That is why I think the important action takes place closer to (1) and (2) rather than (3) or (4).

The ideal/non-ideal theory debate, which is beginning to gain real momentum, will hopefully lead to a more serious debate about which kinds of considerations should be incorporated into (2). Which considerations- of the many, many considerations that arise- should a normative theorist take seriously? (and which should we ignore, etc.) Asking, and attempting to answer, that question will result (hopefully!) in us taking a “big picture” perspective on these issues. And that could really transform our moral sensibilities in important ways. It could open our eyes to new concerns we tended to ignore (e.g. the limitations of government, dangers of group polarization, etc.) or it could help us realize that certain convictions or beliefs are no longer tenable, etc.

I believe the best consequence that will likely result of our taking this big picture perspective is that it is more likely to lead us to taking a *proportionate* response to the different demands of justice that arise in real, non-ideal societies. To ensure our response to any particular demand of justice (X) is fair and proportionate we must appreciate not only the moral stakes at risk in pursuing X (e.g. equality, liberty, sufficiency, etc.), but also the costs, risks and tradeoffs involved with aggressively pursuing X rather than other laudable aims (e.g. Y and Z).

I think further benefits will be reaped by taking “justice-many-things-considered” (rather than (3) or (4)) seriously. It should make normative theorists realize how limited their armchair theorizing is. Defensible normative theories must take empirical considerations seriously and strive for something more meaningful than winning an abstract “first-best conceptualism” debate. A serious debate about which constraints or considerations we should take seriously will necessitate interdisciplinary dialogue and research, and this should help philosophers become more aware of the contentious assumptions they make (but do not have to defend) when they only engage in debate and dialogue amongst themselves. Furthermore, taking these various constraints seriously will make us realize that the demands of justice are provisional (both morally and politically provisional).

Monday, July 30, 2007

APSA notes

How is it that every other panel slot at APSA has no panels I want to go to-- but the other half of the slots have three or more panels apiece I want to go to?

It adds up to an unusually high number of panels I want to attend-- but with an unusually unfortunate distribution of them. Four I want to go to in the awful Thursday 8 am timeslot, when there are always fewer people in the audience than on the panel...

As of today, suddenly it's time to start getting ye olde APSA schedule nailed down. Funny how that happens sometimes; all at once people start scheduling stuff.
Post of the day

With the punchline "you know, all this openness to data and willingness to recheck your assumptions and basic generosity --- are you sure you're really cut out to be a blogger?"

Sunday, July 29, 2007

I know...

that it's silly to keep putting up posts that say "Go read Piled Higher and Deeper," but, well, Go read Piled Higher and Deeper. This sequence should be mandatory reading for advisors...
A proviso

This is the G'Nort Proviso to Matthew Yglesais' celebrated Green Lantern theory of geopolitics:

Even if it were the case that sheer American willpower was almost infinitely powerful, the distinction between minimal competence and massive incompetence would be more powerful still. Or in general form: at any given level of power generated by sheer will and determination, the distinction between minimal competence and massive competence in the use of that power is more powerful still.

Thursday, July 26, 2007

Tomorrow's OU post today!

Because TNR keeps business hours and we don't post directly onto Open University, this won't appear there until morning.

-------------

Rawls continued

A few days ago, Linda Hirshman (I apologize for having misspelled her name a few times below) wrote:


Perversely, Rawlsian liberalism also produced a slippery slope into its opposite, complete selfishness. After all, unless you could achieve the degree of selflessness he required, there was no other place to stop. [...] The game that Rawls set in motion, designed to eliminate common preexisting political values, could also produce the result that everybody simply advocated for himself.

It is not a coincidence that the only successful two-term Democratic presidency of the Age of Rawls was engineered in part for Bill Clinton by Bill Galston, a political theorist with a background in classical thought. Although Galston pays due homage to Rawls, his crucial work is ends-driven, not justified on the blindness of the procedure (his foundational political work is tellingly titled Liberal Purposes). Rawls's work--the best effort to take a tradition grounded in the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries--and make it relevant to a modern, industrial state simply left the country to the conservatives.



I bow to no one in my admiration for Bill Galston, and I do think that Galston was a real contributor to the intllectual shape of Clinton's first campaign and first term, even if he was not strictly necessary for the election to turn out the way it did. But the fact that there has been only one two-term Democratic presidency since 1971 really is, quite thoroughly, a coincidence, not at all causally related to the publication of A Theory of Justice. in that year. George McGovern's defeat came too soon after publication for the book to have had much impact outside academic philosophy yet, and in any event was by a large enough margin that it seems to have been rather overdetermined. A Democrat won in 1976; he lost in 1980, but he was a hectoring moralistic vocal born-again Christian ; whatever the faults of Rawlsianism, they are not the same as Jimmy Carter's.


After Clinton's presidency, only the election of 2000 could yet have generated a two-term Democratic president. So we're down to the elections of 1984, 1988, and (barely) 2000 lost by Democrats, and those of 1992 and 1996 won by Democrats. This is not the sort of electoral imbalance that calls out for any very extraordinary explanation. This is not a Democratic Party that went through some intellectual implosion like the Federalists or the Whigs did. It's a party that loses some and wins some, with the outcomes substantially predictable by the economy in the year and a half preceding each election.

Moreover, over those thirty-five years, the Democrats have controlled the House of Representatives for twenty-five, and the Senate for twenty. The so-called age of Rawls simply has not been a time of mysterious Democratic impotence and Republican dominance; it's been a time of rough parity.

As to selfishness, while I wasn't around before 1971 to witness it myself, I have it on good authority that it was an attribute of political action and human action even way back in 1970, and that a great many elections in American history had been decided on the basis of something other than tens of millions of voters engaged in a disinterested inquiry about the common good.

Linda also wrote:

Just close your eyes, Rawls said, and think of what kind of political society you would make if you didn't know who you were. Black, white, male, female, smart, dumb--you might be anyone who would then have to live in the society you imagined. Rawls said if you did this, you'd produce unlimited free speech and moderately redistributive capitalism. The wags had it that this white male Harvard professor closed his eyes and produced the government of Cambridge, Massachusetts. No matter. It didn't happen.


This is really extraordinary-- a weird cheap shot playing off the ambiguity of "you'd produce." Rawls never said that the thought experiment of the original position was some kind of substitute for political action. It was a way to organize thinking about justice prior to political action. It was a way to reinvigorate thinking about justice at all, in the face of the technocratic utilitarianism characteristic of the era of the best and the brightest, and the aggregative utilitarianism that had passed as thinking about the "common good" for some time before that.

But more generally: I can't understand the relationship between ideas and political life that Linda seems to be implying. Has any work of political philosophy ever caused the realization of its ideas in the society of its writer's birth, to say nothing of doing so within a generation of publication? About as long after the publication of Leviathan, the government of England broke even more decisively from Hobbes' recommendations than it had already done. Germany remained non-communist a generation after Marx; Victorian England remained Victorian in the decades after On Liberty, and Locke's Second Treatise was only published after the revolution its doctrines seemed to justify. America never became Rawls' "realistic utopia," but neither did it become Hayek's or Nozick's or MacIntyre's or Walzer's vision of a just social order. I can't see the relevance of any of that to our evaluation of the arguments within those works, or to whether the works were important, influential, or powerful.

In short: Theory of Justice, like most works of political philosophy, failed to be self-realizing; and American elections since 1971, like most political activity in most societies, went on their way without perceptible causal influences from works of political theory. This is unexceptional as regards either politics or political theory, and doesn't require any special failings of Theory of Justice.

In saying this I don't contradict Keynes' dictum that

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.


I think this largely holds at the level of the public official, not at the level of the mass election. In the West Wing, Democratic staffers might invoke the difference principle; and for all I know White House staffers have occasionally done so in real life. But they have not done so very much, or in ways that would, or did, cost them elections.

Now: the fact that Rawls and Democratic electoral fortunes merely coincided without causation doesn't mean there's nothing to say about the co-incidence. Rawls was relatively appealing in a non-perfectionist intellectual climate that Aristotleans find objectionable, and that intellectual climate had its effects on the shape of liberal political practice. In the wake of the 1960s, appeals to some unitary set of virtues were going to be hard to sustain as foundations for public life, Rawls or no Rawls; the sexual revolution, women's and gay liberation, and the suspicion of courageous military service as a virtue after Vietnam all helped make virtue-language relatively unattractive for a while. And Warren Court liberalism, in pushing hard against some traditional state practices that had been justified in moralistic, paternalistic, or overtly Christian ways, made "neutrality" a kind of liberal watchword. Rawls' critique of perfectionism and embrace of state neutrality among conceptions of the good at the level of basic justice were a good fit with this intellectual climate. But Rawls didn't cause it. The underlying cultural shifts that made perfectionism unavailable to the left until it was married to pluralism by Galston were underway before 1971, and Rawls did no more than offer some inadvertent post-hoc justification for them.

Those cultural shifts are still with us, though the pendulum has swung a good ways back from the extremes of the 1970s. If Linda wants to revitalize Aristotelean virtue-talk for the left, she's right that Rawls offers a kind of obstacle to the project-- but those shifts offer a bigger one. And if she wants to overcome the Rawlsian obstacle, pointing to the electoral failure of Walter Mondale isn't an intellectually successful way to go about it.

A final note: I feel quite sure that Linda as a philosopher already knows everything I've said here, and so I'm embarrassed to have written in a way that must sound condescending. But the essay itself seemed committed to denying or ignoring all these commonplace objections, and so I've replied as best as I could to the essay itself.

Wednesday, July 25, 2007

Plug away

Via orgtheory, Professor Rojas says:

Interested in social movements and organizations? Need something for your course on race and social change? How about a snazzy account of black power politics in the 1960s? Perhaps I can help you fill out that sociology of education syllabus. Might I humbly suggest my new book on the rise of Black Studies in the university?

That’s right. From Black Power to Black Studies is done, the official publication date is this week, and you can order it from Amazon, which means you’ll get it in about a week or so. Read the blurbs at the Johns Hopkins University website, with instructions for desk copies. Did I mention the spiffy 70s style cover?
Gradual School

As far as I can tell, the data from the new report from the Ph.D. Completion Project shows only four disciplines with 10-year doctoral completion rates below about 45%. One of these, computer science, is undoubtedly depressed by graduate students getting attractive job offers and leaving voluntarily (especially since the data span the mid-to-late 1990s).

The other three are Communications, Sociology,...

and Political Science.

(See Slide 7 in that power point presentation.)

Communications has the lowest rate of completion by year, through year 9. But the gap closes steadily over the years 7-9, and by year 10 Political Science seems to have the lowest rate of completion of the three.

This doesn't tell us what proportion of entering students complete sometime after year 10 (which is worrying in one way) and how many drop out or are failed (both worrying in another way). But notice that the completion rates are consistently lower than in econ, and econ grad students certainly have more attractive job opportunities that become available during their years of study. The completion rates are also lower than in the literary humanities, disciplines whose grad students face notoriously bad job prospects that presumably encourage many of them to drop out.

100% completion rates are implausible and undesirable. But completion rates this low suggest that departments and students are doing a bad job matching expectations at the beginning of programs. The departments can't judge who's likely to succeed in grad school, and students can't tell whether a program is a good one for them. Something seems badly wrong. Some discipline has to come in last in these sorts of measures, but we shouldn't take any solace from that. Either econ or English would have a good reason for a very low completion rate; I can't see that political science has any excuse to be behind both.

Prospective grad students, ask for hard data on time to completion and attrition rates!

See Chronicle coverage here, subscription required. See also Professor Rojas' latest round of advice to grad students-- finally reaching the all-important "The only good dissertation is a complete dissertation."
Elsewhere:

Linda Hirshman attributed thirty-five years of American political history to the moral thinness of John Rawls; I began a reply but wandered off into a side issue; Henry Farrell and commentators engaged in a very serious and thoughtful set of arguments about where I wandered to; Matt Yglesias responded to Hirshman more directly. I still intend to do so sometime soon.

Friday, July 20, 2007

Oh, look.

John Gray has written another book.
Gray, a professor at the LSE who is described on the front cover as "the most important living philosopher", has had a fit of Bush-hatred spectacular even by the standards of important living philosophers. But, rather than getting it out of his system over a macrobiotic soufflé in Hampstead, the silly man has gone and built an entire theory of history around it.[...]

Perhaps aware that he is running short of neocons to man his conspiracy, Gray presses Tony Blair into service. The former Prime Minister was not only a classic neocon, we learn, but one whose mendacity bore the stamp of Soviet disinformation: an American poodle and a red under the bed. Bush, though, is not so much a slippery neocon as an old-style fundamentalist Christian whose policies are designed to hasten global warming (sound of box being ticked) and therefore the end of the world. The CIA, meanwhile, has been taken over by shape-shifting lizards telepathically controlled by the ghost of Milton Friedman.

OK, so perhaps that last sentence misrepresents Gray's argument; but Black Mass could hardly be more bonkers if it really was crawling with lizards. Although Gray is by no stretch of the imagination our most important living philosopher, he does slightly remind me of Bertrand Russell in his dotage - a clever man playing to the gallery.

But it's getting late, professor: the main actors have either left the stage or are heading for the wings, and the only people left in the gallery are a few Independent readers. Go home and sleep it off.